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Articles
Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication
Brian Leiter'
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the possible points of
intersection between post-Kantian Continental philosophy and Anglo-American
jurisprudence.' Unfortunately, much of this work has been based on
misunderstandings of Continental thinkers2 or of Anglo-American legal
philosophy. 3 This Article sets itself the modest task of investigating just one
. Assistant Professor of Law and Philosophy. The University of Texas at Austin An earlier 'erson
of this paper was presented as an invited address to the Law & Interpretation Section of the Association
of American Law Schools in New Orleans, January 8. 1995 1 am grateful to Dennis Patterson. Chair of
the Section, for the invitation to present this paper, and to Larty Solum for his comments on that occasion
I also benefitted from questions posed by Larr, Alexander. Randy Barnett. and Stephen Perry at the AALS
session. Thanks also to Sheila Sokolowsk for comments on an early version of the manuscript. Joshua
Brysk and Saul Laureles for research assistance. Jules Coleman and Thomas Moractz for saluable
discussion of the entire manuscript, Jody Kraus for written cnticisms. and Cathy Kemp. Doug La)cock.
and Sandy Levinson for extremely useful comments on the penultimate draft
This Article is an attempt to make good on the promissory note in my Objectvtt. and the Problems
of Jurisprudence, 72 TEX. L. REv. 187, 203 n.60 (1993).
I. Similar developments have occurred in other areas of philosophy as uell See. e g. JOH'N
MCDOWELL, MIND AND WORLD (1994) (drawing on Hegel and Gadamer in discussing basic issucs in
Anglo-American metaphysics and epistemology); Brian Letter. Nietzsche and rite Morahli Critics. 107
ETHIcs (forthcoming Jan. 1997) (discussing use of Nietzsche in recent Anglo-American moral philosophy)
2. See, e.g., Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN L. REv 869 (1988). Pierre Schlag..lluing
Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. RE, 1195. 1205-07 (1989) Both of these essays
misinterpret Nietzsche's thought. On Frug's misunderstanding of Nietzsche. see Brian Leiter. Intelectual
Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship. 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79. 81-90 (1992) [hereinafter Leiter. Intellectual
Voyeurism]; contrast Schlag's misguided comments on Nietzsche with Brian Letter. The Paradot of
Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche, in WILLING AND NOTHINGNESS: SCHOPENHALER AS NIET'ZS'E'S
EDUCATOR (C. Janaway ed.. forthcoming 1997). For other discussions of the problem w~tth the way law -
yers have used philosophy, see Charles W. Collier. The Use and Abuse of Humanuic Theors in Law
Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship. 41 DUKE LJ 191 (199 L. Leiter.
Intellectual Voyeurism, supra, at 91-101; Alan R. Madry. Analytrc Deconstructionisni ' The Intellectual
Voyeurism of Anthony DAmato, 63 FORDHAMi L. REv. 1033 (1995); Martha C Nussbaum. The Use and
Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv 1627 (1993).
3. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding. The Legal Subject and the Problem
of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105 (1993). Balkin writes.
Since H.L.A. Hart, jurisprudence has been grounded on the so-called "'internal point of
view"-she perspective of a participant in the legal system who regards its laws as norms for
her behavior. In contrast, I believe that we must ground jurisprudence in a critical pcrspecti'c.
one that employs ideological critique to reflect on our internal experience of lay% A critical
perspective takes seriously the contributions of subjectivity to the nature of law. it treats the
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possible point of intersection between the Continental and Anglo-American
traditions: between Heidegger's account of human "being-in-the-world" as
based on the exercise of noncognitive coping skills and one traditional project
of Anglo-American jurisprudence, namely to provide a descriptively adequate
and normatively attractive theory of adjudication. If Heidegger is right in his
account of "being-in-the-world," what bearing does this have on the attempt
to construct a theory of adjudication?4 This Article sets out my answer-one
that, I hope, does justice to the integrity of both Anglo-American jurisprudence
and Heidegger's thought.
Part I sets out the traditional understanding of the theory of adjudication
within the Anglo-American tradition, calling particular attention to the relation
between the descriptive and normative ambitions of such a theory. Part II
explains Heidegger's view that all human understanding depends upon the
possession of mindless coping skills that resist theoretical articulation. Part III
sociology of knowledge as a full partner in the jurisprudential enterprise. Instead of taking for
granted the primacy of the internal viewpoint of participants in the legal system, a critical
perspective asks how this internal experience comes about.
Id. at I10-11 (footnote omitted); cf. id. at 128 (criticizing Joseph Raz's use of "internal point of view").
In this passage-and, indeed, in the rest of the article-Balkin seems not to appreciate the
philosophical reasons for taking "the internal point of view," which grow out of the hermeneutic tradition
in the philosophy of social science. According to this tradition, the only way to understand human practices
is by understanding their meaning to participants in those practices. Hart wants to understand the human
institution known as "law," and because he accepts the hermeneutic point, he thinks he must understand
"law" from an "internal point of view." Hart is not "taking for granted the primacy of the internal
viewpoint"; he takes the internal viewpoint as primary for quite substantial reasons arising from the
philosophy of social science. For a rich discussion of these issues, see Stephen R. Perry, Interpretation and
Methodology in Legal Theory, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 97 (Andrei
Marmor ed., 1995). It may be interesting to ask also about the factors that caused the practice to have the
"meaning" it does to its participants-the question Balkin calls on us to answer-but this question is simply
a non sequitur on Hart's project: To understand the meaning of a human practice is one thing, to understand
its causes another. What is missing in Balkin's analysis is an argument either that: (a) we ought simply to
change the subject; or (b) the questions of jurisprudence really collapse into questions in the "sociology
of knowledge." I, myself, am not unsympathetic to such arguments, and try to say more about this in a
forthcoming work on American legal realism. See BRIAN LEITER, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
NATURALIZED JURISPRUDENCE (forthcoming); see also discussion infra Part IV.
Balkin does argue that the "internal" perspectives of participants in the practice may vary. See Balkin,
supra, at 128. But he does not actually show that they do vary with respect to those aspects of "law" that
Hart thinks need accounting for in a suitable jurisprudential theory: most importantly, the "normative"
aspect of law, the sense in which a norm's being a "legal" norm affects practical reasoning. The point is
a relatively simple one: If I say, "Don't go faster than 65 m.p.h. on the highway" that may give you
reasons for acting (depending, for instance, on whether you think I am a good driver, knowledgeable about
the roads, sensitive to your schedule, etc.). But when the Texas legislature issues the same
prescription--"Don't go faster than 65 m.p.h. on the highway"--that adds certain reasons for action that
were not present when I articulated the same norm. The jurisprudential question concerns what this
"normativity" actually consists in; whether, for instance, this is the normativity of mere prudence, or
whether the normativity of law is simply redundant on the normativity of morality. Again, for a useful
discussion, see Perry, supra.
Balkin's article, then, is a case of some interesting ideas, derived (loosely speaking) from the
Continental tradition in philosophy, which fail to make contact with the Anglo-American tradition in legal
philosophy because of a fundamental misunderstanding of that tradition.
4. Note that I do not address the question at any length of whether Heidegger really is right. Such an
undertaking is plainly beyond the scope of this Article. While I am skeptical about some of the strong
forms of Heidegger's claim, I think that his ideas are interesting enough, and poorly enough understood,
that they warrant a sympathetic hearing of the sort I try to give here.
HeinOnline  -- 106 Yale L.J. 254 1996-1997
Heidegger
suggests how Heidegger's thesis may threaten the descriptive ambitions of the
theory of adjudication. Finally, Part IV concludes by considering some
jurisprudential rejoinders to Heidegger, as well as both some of the limitations
and possible uses of Heidegger's critique. In particular, I try to show that the
Heideggerian critique does lend support to theories of judicial decisionmaking
that many lawyers have found attractive in recent years: the so-called "practical
reasoning" or "practical wisdom" theories. 5 The Heideggerian critique, I will
argue, provides a fruitful way of reconceiving these theories; one that
vindicates their basic insight about the practical competence requisite for
judging, while deflecting the most damning criticism of such theories, namely
that they fail to provide concrete guidance to judges. The Heideggerian critique
will illuminate both the limitations of the traditional project for a theory of
adjudication, as well as what is correct in those recent "practical reasoning"
theories of adjudication that are often ignored by analytic jurisprudence.
I. THEORY OF ADJUDICATION
On one prevalent understanding, a theory of adjudication aims to discharge
descriptive and normative functions: It both provides an accurate description
of how judges really do decide cases and, at the same time, strives to tell
judges how they ought to decide them. 6 Even a theory like Ronald Dworkin's
honors the descriptive ambitions of the theory of adjudication. For though real
judges are less methodical than Dworkin's ideal judge Hercules, Dworkin
contends that "Hercules shows us the hidden structure of their judgments and
so lays these open to study and criticism. ' '7 Thus, Herculean decisionmaking
purportedly describes actual judicial decisionmaking-if not on its surface,
then with respect to its underlying logic and structure.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 85-106.
6. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Need for a Theor of Legal Theories As5isng Pragmatic
Instrumentalism, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 988. 989 (1984) (reviewing ROBERT S SL%IItRS.
INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982)) (stating that theory of adjudication tells us
"how judges decide and ought to decide cases"); Steven Walt. Sone Problens of Pragmatic Jurisprudence.
70 TEx. L. REV. 317, 324 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER. THE PROBLEMS OF JLRtSPRtDE.,CE
(1990)) (noting that "theory of adjudication ... accounts for how judges reach results based on a scalth
of facts and how they ought to do so").
7. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 265 (1986). Duorkin is. of course, a bit sague about %shat
degree of descriptive "fit" is required before we can turn to normative considerations It might escn be
thought that normative considerations are implicit at the level of fit For example. a thcor). to be
descriptively adequate, need not account for those cases where judges decide based on which side offers
the largest bribe. While this is plainly true for Dworkin. it may not be true for all untcrs interested in
theories of adjudication. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human7 Part Two As Through a Class
Darkly, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 233, 240 (1931). In general, the question is this Must the theory be
descriptively adequate to the sorts of reasons judges give in their opinions for their decisions, or must it
be descriptively adequate to the real grounds of decision, where those may diserge from the reasons gi'.en
in opinions? One difference between Legal Realism and the mainstream of the Anglo-American tradition
of jurisprudence is the answer it gives to this question
1996]
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Conceived as both a descriptive and normative account, the theory of
adjudication is a strange hybrid, standing almost alone in the philosophical
world. For most philosophical theories do not aim to discharge both descriptive
and normative functions in this way-that is, they do not try to first describe
a practice, and then use the description as a basis for normative guidance. 8 For
example, the theory of knowledge (at least as conceived by everyone but W.V.
Quine) has no descriptive component; it aims to promulgate norms for belief
formation, not to describe how we actually form beliefs.9 Some contemporary
naturalists do contend that descriptive claims from cognitive science
concerning how the human brain really processes information are at least
relevant to the normative program of epistemology. Norms for what we ought
to believe, these philosophers argue, must take into account our actual
cognitive capacities if the normative advice offered by epistemologists is to be
useful.'0 But even for these philosophers, what we actually do in
epistemological matters (with respect to the justification of belief) does not
matter: Our current epistemological practices could be thoroughly
8. Let me be clear about what I am saying here: Philosophical theories do try to be descriptively
adequate to our intuition about normative matters (for instance, how ought one to act and what ought one
to believe). But to be descriptively adequate to one's intuitions about normative matters is plainly not the
same as being descriptively adequate to our actual practices (for instance, how we actually act, what we
actually believe, etc.).
There are, of course, branches of philosophy that are not essentially normative (i.e., they do not aim
to describe what ought to be done or what ought to be believed). Thus, in metaethics the philosopher aims
"to make sense of a practice having [certain] features," namely those that are "manifest in ordinary moral
practice as it is engaged in by ordinary folk." MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM 5 (1994). Philosophy
of science is arguably similar (though some philosophers of science, I suspect, would contest this
characterization). The philosopher of science does try to be descriptively adequate to the actual practices
of the natural sciences (indeed, it was precisely on this score that writers like Kuhn and Feyerabend got
a foothold for their now famous critiques of positivist philosophy of science). Philosophers of science do
not try to tell scientists how they ought to proceed; rather, they try to reconstruct (i.e., describe) the logic
of scientific methodology. Philosophy of science aims only for descriptive adequacy, but it has no
normative ambitions vis-A-vis natural science. (Historically, of course, philosophies of science constructed
on the model of the natural sciences were employed normatively to criticize the practice of the social or
"human" sciences: Such disciplines were charged with not being scientific at all if they did not conform
to the logic of scientific methodology as manifest in the natural sciences.) Thus, the theory of adjudication
is anomalous in its conjoining of descriptive and normative ambitions in one theory, and in assigning
lexical priority to the descriptive claims.
9. On the Quinean conception of a naturalized epistemology, by contrast, there is no (significant)
normative component: Epistemology falls into place as a chapter of psychology precisely because the
primary ambition of the theory is to describe the causal connections between sensory input and cognitive
output. See W.V. QUINE, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS 69,
75-84 (1969). For Quine's wavering on the issue of normativity, see W.V. QUINE, PURSUIT o TRUrtI
19-20 (1990). Quine's purely descriptive conception of epistemology is widely (though perhaps not rightly)
thought to be deficient. See, e.g., Jaegwon Kim, What Is Naturalized Epistemology?, reprinted in
NATURALIZING EPISTEMOLOGY 33 (Hilary Komblith ed., 1994); Stephen Stich, Naturalizing Epistemology:
Quine, Simon and the Prospects for Pragmatism, in PHILOSOPHY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE 1, 3-5
(Christopher Hookway & Donald Peterson eds., 1993). An analogous difficulty arises in the "naturalized"
jurisprudence that I associate with Legal Realism. I take up the general problem at length in a book I am
currently writing. See LEITER, supra note 3.
10. See, e.g., ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION (1986); Philip Kitcher, The
Naturalists Return, 101 PHIL. REV. 53 (1992); Larry Laudan, Normative Naturalism, 57 PHIL. ScI. 44
(1990).
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wrongheaded, and thus no theory of knowledge needs to accurately describe
them.
Theories of knowledge, to repeat, are not alone in this respect. Theories
of morality, for example, tell us how we ought to act, not how we do act.
Indeed, such theories sometimes allow for the possibility that no one acts
morally at all!" But theories of adjudication never claim that, even though
no real judge in fact decides this way, this is how judges ought to decide.
Notice that a lexical conjoining of descriptive and normative elements in
a theory necessarily constrains the normative reach of the theory. For if it is
not possible for the theory to declare existing practice wholly depraved,
corrupt, and misguided-precisely because the theory must first be
descriptively adequate to existing practice-then the normative demands of the
theory are, accordingly, circumscribed.
Why then would legal philosophers think theories of adjudication must be
not only normatively attractive but also descriptively accurate? One likely
explanation for why one might conceive these theories differently from theories
of knowledge and morality is surely this: There is a presumption that current
adjudicative practice is roughly right.'2 Call this view that current
adjudicative practice is roughly right the "Presumption." The Presumption
explains why a theory of adjudication must have both a descriptive and
prescriptive component: because a good description (of a roughly right
normative practice) necessarily constrains prescription. For since the practice
itself is presumed to be normatively attractive, a description of that practice
must then coincide, to some degree, with whatever normative guidance the
theory proffers. 3
The Presumption tells us why a theory of adjudication must have both
descriptive and normative elements. But what precise relation do the
descriptive and normative ambitions of the theory bear to each other? John
Mackie, commenting on Dworkin's theory, has given apt expression to what
is surely the most common understanding:
[Dworkin's] theory of [adjudication] combines descriptive with
prescriptive elements. On the one hand, Professor Dworkin is claiming
that it gives the best theoretical understanding of legal procedures and
legal reasoning actually at work in such systems as those of England
and the United States. But on the other, he wants it to be more
11. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 74-75 (H-i Paton
trans., Harper & Row 1964); HJ. Paton, Analysis of the Argument. in KANT. supra. at 25-26
12. An alternative explanation, suggested to me by Doug Laycock. is the tendency for Anglo-Amencan
lawyers to keep their normative proposals not too far removed from existing practice so that they stand a
greater chance of changing that practice.
13. It is the Presumption, then, that contributes to the essentially conservative character of most work
in analytic jurisprudence.
1996]
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explicitly accepted and more consciously followed. He wants it to
become a truer description than it yet is ....
I shall call Mackie's gloss on the relation between descriptive and normative
elements the "Standard Relation." According to the Standard Relation, the
normative ambition of a theory of adjudication is that judges ought to do
"more explicitly and more consciously" what it is the theory claims (as a
descriptive matter) they largely do already. We can recognize the very same
conception of the Standard Relation in the theory of adjudication in someone
as "unDworkinian" as Oliver Wendell Holmes, who complains that
"judges ... have failed adequately to recognize their duty of [explicitly]
weighing considerations of social advantage."' 15 But what judges "ought" to
do-that is, explicitly weigh considerations of social advantage-is, on
Holmes's view, precisely what it is they are really doing anyway, albeit
"inarticulate[ly], and often unconsciously].' ' 16 Thus, Holmes, like Mackie's
Dworkin, demands only that judges "ought" to do what it is they already do,
albeit more explicitly and consciously.
There is a final feature of the theory of adjudication to which we need to
attend before we turn to Heidegger. This has to do with the meaning of
"theory" in the theory of adjudication. What makes an understanding of
adjudication "theoretical"? Roughly, the idea is this: A theoretical
understanding of any domain of human activity is one that provides an explicit
articulation or reconstruction of the rules that govern and explain activity in the
domain. Thus, a theory of adjudication makes explicit the rules that govern and
explain judicial decisions. Such rules, then, are both descriptive of, and
normative for, proper decisionmaking in the sense captured in Mackie's
articulation of the Standard Relation. These rules describe the explicit decision
procedure judges generally follow, and they define the explicit decision
procedure that judges ought to follow more consciously and regularly. Theory,
then, presupposes that such activity, even if partly or wholly unreflective, can
be reconstructed in terms of the rules that govern and regulate activity in the
domain.
So, for example, a theory of adjudication is typically thought to include,
among other elements, an account of the proper standards of decision.' 7 Are
moral considerations grounds for decision? Or are only rules with the right sort
of social pedigree proper standards for decision? Quite crudely, Dworkin
14. John Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY
JURISPRUDENCE 161, 163 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1983).
15. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 467 (1897).
16. Id. This placing of Holmes differs, in emphasis, from what I say in the section on "Normative
Theory of Adjudication" in Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 261, 276-77 (D.M. Patterson ed., 1996). The ambiguity of Holmes's normative position
was impressed on me in conversation with Stephen Perry.
17. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 1003; Walt, supra note 6, at 324.
[Vol. 106: 253
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answers the former question in the affirmative;" while positivists like Joseph
Raz answer the latter question in the affirmative. 9 Some, like Jules Coleman,
H.L.A. Hart, and David Lyons, insist that the proper standards for decision are
given by some hybrid answer to these questions.20 The details do not matter
for our purposes here. What is important to note is that these writers suppose
that a theory of adjudication that identifies the standards for decision must set
out rules that both describe the standards judges, by and large, actually do use
and that are, at the same time, the standards they ought to use.
Suppose we were to agree that among the standards for decision are the
rules or, perhaps, moral principles articulated in certain authoritative sources.
We would still need to know, as part of a satisfactory theory of adjudication,
how judges do and should construe these authoritative sources to determine
what rules they stand for, and also which authoritative sources (and their
concomitant rules) are controlling in any particular case. Let us take this latter
component of a theory of adjudication in particular, since it is central to the
process of reasoning by analogy and to the doctrine of precedent. How do we
know that the "rule" of one case applies to some later case? Recall Karl
Llewellyn's famous gloss on what he calls the "strict" doctrine of precedent,
according to which the rule is confined to the particular facts, resulting in
doctrines like, "This rule holds only of redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta
Buick cars.' Or consider, similarly, Holmes's
story of a Vermont justice of the peace before whom a suit was
brought by one farmer against another for breaking a chum. The
justice took time to consider, and then said that he had looked through
the statutes [and reporters] and could find nothing about churns, and
gave judgment for the defendant.-"
Both of these fanciful examples illustrate that central to any adequate account
of the doctrine of precedent (as part of the theory of adjudication) must be
some theory of what we may call "relevance" judgments-the judgments by
18. See, e.g.. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (explaining that those norms that
provide both best explanation and best justification---as matter of political moraihty -of prior institutional
history are legally binding).
19. See JOSEPH RAz, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Lais. in THE ALtnioiTrn oF LA%% I1979P
(claiming that only norms that have social source-e.g.. being enacted b. legislature-arc legally binding)
20. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, Postscript to THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Joseph Raz & Penelope Bulloch eds.
2d ed. 1994) (1961); Jules L. Coleman. Negative and Positive Positivism. II J LEGAL S'TD 139 l982).
reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONT EMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE. supra note 14. at 28. Da% id Lyons.
Principles, Positivism and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415. 425 (1977) (resvei ng DWORKI%. supra note
18) (arguing that moral considerations are legally binding insofar as they have social source, including. e g.
convention among relevant officials to employ moral considerations to resol'.e disputes) On the issues here.
see generally W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994) and Jules L Coleman & Bnan Letter.
Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEOR'. supra note 16. at 241.
243-59.
21. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 72 (1930)
22. Holmes, supra note 15, at 474-75.
1996]
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which we say "this case is relevantly similar to that one" and "that case is
different in a relevant respect and thus not controlling."23 The color of Buicks
will rarely be a relevant fact, and so the "strict" construction of the rule of the
prior case that Llewellyn imagines is patently silly. So, too, one suspects the
Vermont reporters contained instances of one person breaking the personal
property of another, cases which should have been controlling even in the
absence of a prior litigation over churns. A complete theory of adjudication
would tell us how we know that the color of Buicks is not relevant in
Llewellyn's example, and how we know that other cases in which one person
broke the property of another are relevant in the chum case.
Do real judges fare so badly in making "relevance" judgments? In teaching
constitutional law, I am always struck by Justice O'Connor's opinion in New
York v. United States.24 The case presented the question of whether federal
regulation of radioactive waste disposal by the states infringed upon state
sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment.2 At first sight, the Court's
decision only seven years earlier in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authorit/16 would seem to be controlling. There, the Court held that
the primary protection for the federalism values embodied in the Tenth
Amendment comes from the political process itself; only where the political
process has broken down must the Court step in to enforce the Tenth
Amendment. 27 As Justice O'Connor noted in dissent in Garcia, on this new
process-based approach to federalism, "all that stands between the remaining
essentials of state sovereignty and Congress is the latter's underdeveloped
capacity for self-restraint." 28
Fair as that observation might be, Garcia would seem controlling on the
facts of New York. Indeed, as the federal regulation at issue had relied heavily
upon proposals generated by the states themselves through the National
Governors' Association,29 this would seem a clear case of the political
process operating in a way respectful of state autonomy.3" Yet Justice
O'Connor, in a splendid exercise in applying Llewellyn's "strict" doctrine of
precedent, claims that the new case is factually unique: While prior cases
concerned the power of Congress to subject the states to generally applicable
23. Although I shall concentrate in what follows on the Background of intelligibility required for the
making of relevancy judgments, it bears noting that there are many other features of legal judgment that
present related difficulties: for example, judgments about "reasonableness" (as in the omnipresent
"reasonableness" standards in the law) or judgments about what does or does not constitute an "exception"
to a rule. I concentrate on judgments of "relevancy" because these are central to analogical reasoning,
which, in turn, is central to judging. But judgments of "relevance" are only one of many subtle judgments
made by lawyers and judges that may not admit of theoretical reconstruction.
24. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
25. See id. at 149.
26. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
27. See id. at 555-56.
28. Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
29. See New York, 505 U.S. at 150.
30. See id. at 194-98 (White, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 106: 253
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laws, New York involved a federal law applicable only to the states. Thus,
according to Justice O'Connor, New York really concerns the power of
Congress to "use the States as implements of regulation."'" In short, the issue
is "whether Congress may direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate
in a particular field or a particular way, '32 and so Garcia is inapposite.
In dissent, Justice White essentially asks whether this factual difference
between the cases is a relevant difference in the federalism context. "The
alleged diminution in state authority over its own affairs," Justice White
pointedly observes, "is not any less because the federal mandate restricts the
activities of private parties."33 In other words, the relevant fact in both cases
is that we are dealing with a federal regulation that usurps state autonomy;
where that is the significant element, Garcia controls. The fact that, in the
course of usurping state sovereignty, Congress also regulates private parties is
irrelevant with respect to federalism values. On the relevant facts, Garcia and
New York are the same case. Justice White's complaint, in short, is that Justice
O'Connor has distinguished Garcia on the grounds that the rule there only
applies to "pale magenta Buicks," while the present case concerns a bright red
Cadillac. But Justice White's point is precisely that the make or color of the
cars are not relevant facts, and so the difference should have no effect on the
outcome.
Whether Justice White is correct is not, ultimately, the question that
interests me here. The important question here is: How do we know what the
"relevant" facts are in comparing Garcia and New York? What criteria apply
to the making of such a judgment about relevance? And do these criteria admit
of the sort of explicit articulation and reconstruction required for a complete
theory of adjudication?
This is the point at which Heidegger becomes relevant. Heidegger can be
read as arguing that such criteria can never be made fully explicit, and thus it
follows that a theory of adjudication can never discharge its descriptive
ambitions. To the extent that the theory of adjudication is in the business of
description, the theory of adjudication is out of business. In any event, this, I
shall argue, is what some themes from Heidegger suggest.
31. Id. at 161.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 202 (White, J., concumng in part and dissenting in part) My version of the majority opinion
follows Justice White's reading of it more closely than partisans of federalism values may like Arguably.
we could reconstruct Justice O'Connor's point as follows: Federalism values are more seriously implicated
where the federal regulation reaches a distinctive state function, like regulation, than %khen it reaches
activities that states have in common with private actors, like economic activities. In that c'cnt. the fact
that the regulation in New York only reaches the state is indicative of the fact that it encroaches more
profoundly on the autonomy of the state. This is certainly a more charitable understanding of Justice
O'Connor's argument, though it is not clear that this is the argument she actually makes. Moreover. such
an argument seems like a roundabout attempt to revive the "traditional government functions" approach
explicitly repudiated in Garcia. In that case, Justice O'Connor's opinion is still an end run around the
earlier decision. For my purposes in the text, however, none of these points matter If an thing. they scr'e
to underline Llewellyn's point about the plasticity of precedent.
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II. HEIDEGGER
I want to say, first, some words by way 6f introduction to Heidegger, since
his notorious obscurantism, 34 together with his seeming remoteness from the
concerns of legal scholarship, make him an off-putting figure. 3' Heidegger
was a pupil of the German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl and Heidegger's
most famous work, Being and Time,36 is a phenomenological study of the
way human beings "are" in the world. For Husserl, phenomenology was to
have been the methodology that finally yielded the Cartesian aspiration of a
presuppositionless philosophy. Phenomenology was to have done this by
concerning itself only with the phenomena that comprise our conscious
experience, bracketing all questions about what connection the phenomena that
comprise consciousness have with a world "out there."37 Phenomenologists
objected that previous philosophies had relied on all sorts of unchallenged
conceptual baggage in describing the world without actually undertaking a
careful examination of the content of our conscious experience itself.38
Husserl's illusion was that we could free ourselves of all
prejudices-linguistic, grammatical, conceptual-if we only turned away from
traditional metaphysics and tried simply to describe the detailed nature of our
conscious experience.
Heidegger adopts the phenomenological methodology, but rejects both
Husserl's idea of "bracketing" the world, as well as the idea that the study of
34. Heidegger's often obscure prose is defended-not convincingly to my mind-in HUBERT L.
DREYFUS, BEING-IN-THE-WORLD 7-8 (1991); indeed, it would seem that Dreyfus's splendid clarity on the
same themes undercuts his defense of Heidegger's often absurd prose style.
35. The fact that he was a Nazi, who later lied about his involvement with Nazism, as well as a
bastard-personally and politically-are also aspects of Heidegger that make him an unattractive figure.
For discussion of the relevant biographical facts, see VICTOR FARIAS, HEIDEGGER AND NAZISM (Joseph
Margolis & Tom Rockmore eds. & Paul Burrell trans., Temple Univ. Press 1989) (1987). One attraction
of Hubert Dreyfus's influential interpretation of Heidegger is that it extracts from Heidegger arguments and
themes that are of independent philosophical interest, and that do not seem to be linked to his Nazism. But
I have little doubt that other aspects of Heidegger's thought (not considered here) and his Nazism are
deeply linked, the protestations of Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty, among others, notwithstanding. See.
e.g., Jacques Derrida, Philosopher's Hell: An Interview, in THE HEIDEGGER CONTROVERSY, 264, 266-67
(Richard Wolin ed., 1991); Richard Rorty, Taking Philosophy Seriously, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. II, 1988,
at 31, 32-33 (reviewing VICTOR FARIAS, HEIDEGGER ET LA NAZISME (1987)). As Nietzsche has observed:
"[O]ur ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of us with the necessity with which
a tree bears fruit-related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one soil,
one sun." FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 16 (Walter Kaufman ed. & Walter
Kaufman & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1969). Heidegger's Nazism and his philosophy were "fruit" of the same
tree, and it would be astounding if there were not some affinities, at some level, between the disgusting
political and personal record of the man and the philosophy he propounded. For a reading of Heidegger
that vindicates this Nietzschean perspective, see GEORGE STEINER, HEIDEGGER (1978). However, it still
seems to me that the Heideggerian themes that Dreyfus develops can be parsed from Heidegger's Nazism,
even if other aspects of his thought cannot.
36. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962).
37. See EDMUND HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY
(Dorion Cairns trans., 1970).
38. Cf HEIDEGGER, supra note 36, at 50 (noting that phenomenology "is opposed to taking over any
conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated").
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conscious experience could be presuppositionless. Indeed-and this is central
for Heidegger-the phenomenological investigation of human experience
reveals a rich and essential structure of "presuppositions" that resist explicit
articulation. As Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow helpfully explain:
Heidegger's phenomenology stresses the idea that human subjects are
formed by the historical cultural practices in which they develop.
These practices form a background which can never be made
completely explicit, and so cannot be understood in terms of the
beliefs of a meaning-giving subject. The background practices do,
however, contain a meaning. They embody a way of understanding
and coping with things, people, and institutions. Heidegger calls this
meaning in the practices an interpretation, and proposes to make
manifest certain general features of this interpretation. In Being and
Time he calls his method, which amounts to giving an interpretation
of the interpretation embodied in everyday practices, hermeneutics."
The key notion here is that of the "Background." The phenomenological
study of human experience, of the human way of "being" or existing in the
world, reveals the existence of a Background which renders the world
meaningful and intelligible, yet which itself resists explicit articulation in
cognitive terms. What constitutes this Background? Different writers in the
modem hermeneutic and phenomenological traditions emphasize different
factors. Heidegger's student Hans-Georg Gadamer, for example, places the
emphasis on what we might call the "cultural authorities" from whom we
acquire those enabling "prejudices" as to what is relevant, important,
meaningful: the teachers, novelists, poets, "canonical" works, and the like, that
mark every academic discipline and every global Weltanschauung.' By
contrast, the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty locates the core
of the Background in the orientation towards the world we have in virtue of
our embodiment as certain sorts of physical bodies, with their characteristic
height, weight, shape, rhythm of movement, the whole cumbersomeness or
easiness or awkwardness that marks our physical presence in the classroom,
the dining hall, the bedroom, etc. The intelligibility of the world, according to
Merleau-Ponty, is determined, at the most fundamental level, by what it is like
to be a certain sort of physical body in that world.'
39. HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHAEL FOUCAULT- BEYOND STRLCI RA.IS' .',',D
HERMENEUTrcS xxi (2d ed. 1983).
40. See, e.g., HANS-GEORG GADAMER. TRUTH AND METHOD 248-49 tGarrcti Bardcn & John
Cumming eds. & trans., Crossroad Publ'g Co. 1975) (1960). For a mor: substantial discussion %kth
particular reference to law, see David Couzens Hoy. Interpreting the Las Hernieneutita! and
Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 136 (1985).
41. See MAURICE MERLEAU-PoNTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 98-206 (Cohn Smith trans.
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But by far the most influential account-one that resonates in, even as it
is modified by, writers like Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty-is Heidegger's,
which has, in turn, been adopted in more recent years by writers like the
French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu.42 In these writers, the emphasis is
roughly on a type of "socialization," an acquisition of practical know-how that
is basic to becoming part of a human community. 43 It is this "average
everydayness," as Heidegger calls it," in which human beings live that the
philosophical tradition has ignored but that at the same time forms the
Background of intelligibility against which all of our philosophical and other
cognitive judgments are made.
This notion is clearest in Heidegger's famous distinction between that
which is present-at-hand and that which is ready-to-hand. 45 Let me start with
an example that will help make Heidegger's point. I might make a catalogue
of the items in my study: chair, desk, desk lamp, computer, papers, articles,
notebooks, bookshelves, books, filing cabinet, pencil sharpener, stapler, pencils,
pens, scissor, magnifying glass. Just in the act of making this catalogue I have
changed my relationship to these items; I find myself looking about the study,
individuating the items, adding them to the list. Let us take the cognite46
42. Arguably similar notions are at work in the later Wittgenstein, as well as in Harold Garfinkel's
ethnomethodology, Charles Taylor's work on the philosophy of the human sciences, and some recent work
in analytic philosophy. See ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT ExPLICIT (1994); HAROLD GARFINKEL,
STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY (1967); CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES
(1985); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (R. Rhees ed. & G.E.M. Anscombc ed.
& trans., 1953).
. In the legal literature, the themes in the text are most often associated with the work of Wittgenstein.
See, e.g., Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937
(1990). One advantage of considering Heidegger's arguments for similar conclusions is that Heidegger,
unlike Wittgenstein and his various followers, offers a more detailed philosophical story both about what
practices consist in and why it is they resist theoretical articulation. For Wittgenstein, practice too often
functions as an inquiry-stopper: When the philosophical going gets complex, the Wittgensteinian cries, "It's
all a matter of knowing how to go on with the practice"--end of story. (I am reminded, in this regard, of
the philosopher Larry Sklar's emendation of the famous Wittgenstein dictum on the task of philosophy:
"Philosophy leaves everything as it is-in a fog.") The philosophical burden on the proponent of such a
move should be heavy; Heidegger has the virtue of carrying more of this burden than Wittgenstein. (I am
indebted here to Sandy Levinson for raising these issues with me.)
43. As Cathy Kemp has correctly reminded me, practical know-how does not exhaust our account of
the Background in the phenomenological tradition. There are, for example, aspects of our experience of
things and persons-a certain "ambiance," or "orientation," or "affect"-that are, like the Background of
practical skills, not reducible to cognitive propositions, but at the same time are also not reducible to
practical skills. Needless to say, I do not aim to be comprehensive in my characterization of the
phenomenological tradition; I call attention to one important theme, one that we may fruitfully try to
understand in its application to theories of adjudication. Other aspects of the Background might pose related
difficulties for theories of adjudication.
44. HEIDEGGER, supra note 36, at 69.
45. The Macquarrie and Robinson translation of HEIDEGGER, supra note 36, popularized these terms
in the English speaking world. The German words-Zuhandenheit (i.e., "readiness-to-hand") and Vor-hand-
en-heit (i.e., "presence-at-hand")--do not have neat English equivalents. Three analytic Heidegger scholars
(William Blattner, John Haugeland, and Dreyfus) have suggested instead the terms "availableness" and
"occurrentness," though I confess I find these unattractive substitutes. See, e.g., DREYFUS, supra note 34,
at xi.
46. The "cognitive" aspect of an activity is that aspect (e.g., judging, "This is a pen.") that can be
evaluated in terms of its truth and falsity. Noncognitive activity-like screeching, cooing, or moaning-is,
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aspect of this activity: individuating things and writing down their names on
a list. In doing this I view the things as "present-at-hand," for they are
presented in "a bare perceptual cognition."'47 They are mere things available
to detached looking. But this, says Heidegger, is to change their more basic
way of being, the more basic way they exist for us. For these
things-Heidegger calls them "equipment'"s---exist most basically as things
that are "ready-to-hand. ' 49 That is, these items exist for me most basically as
things with which I do various things; they exist, Heidegger says, as
"'something in-order-to ... ,.,o The chair exists for me in-order-to-sit; the
table in-order-to-work; the pencil sharpener in-order-to-sharpen; the pen in-
order-to-write-on-paper; the pencil in-order-to-write-in-a-book; and so forth.
When we deal with what is ready-to-hand, what exists first and foremost as
things that are useful for various purposes, "this readiness-to-hand is itself
understood," says Heidegger, "though not thematically," that is, not as a matter
of theoretical knowledge.5 We know these things through what Heidegger
calls "circumspection"-the "kind of sight" we have "when we deal with
[things] by using them and manipulating them."52 And it is through
circumspection-this way of practical seeing or knowing-that any piece of
equipment "acquires its specific Thingly character.' 5
3
This last claim is particularly important. Using his favorite example of the
hammer, Heidegger often says things like, "the less we just stare at the
hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more
primordial does our relationship to it become."' But why, exactly, is the
practical relationship more "primordial," more basic?
Now, plainly, the relationship to things as ready-to-hand is almost always
temporally prior to the detached looking at them as things present-at-hand.
"The presence-at-hand of entities is thrust to the fore," says Heidegger, only
when there are breaks "in that referential totality in which circumspection
'operates."' 55 While reading a book with pencil in hand, I reach to my left
(where the pencil sharpener sits) to sharpen the pencil; I stick the pencil in and
nothing happens. What had been ready-to-hand, the pencil sharpener which
exists for me as equipment-for-sharpening is suddenly present-at-hand: I now
by contrast, not apt for evaluation in terms of truth and falsity because it asserts nothing about the %orld
that might be true or false.
47. HEIDEGGER, supra note 36, at 95.
48. "Equipment" are the entities we encounter in the mode of "Being-in" that Hedcggcr calls
"concern," i.e., "having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking
after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go. undertaking. accomplishing.
evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining . . .- Id. at 83.
49. The "Being" of equipment, says Heidegger. is readness-to-hand See. e g. id. at 98
50. Id. at 97.
51. Id. at 104.
52. Id. at 98.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 107.
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look at it, rather than simply deal with it automatically as something with a
use. It does not function; it shatters the circumspective absorption one has with
equipment when that equipment functions in its practical capacity. The pencil
sharpener now becomes an object of theoretical knowledge, its presence falling
into sharp relief against the background of all the ready-to-hand equipment that
comprises my study (the computer, the table, the books, the pencil, etc.). It is
a thing to be inspected, stared at, in an effort to make it resume the ordinary
mode of being of equipment, that is, as ready-to-hand. It was ready-to-hand
first, present-at-hand second.
But Heidegger has more than this in mind by asserting the "primordial"
status of the relationship to things as ready-to-hand. Heidegger also means that
the status of things as ready-to-hand is epistemologically basic in the sense that
theoretical knowledge is parasitic upon the practical know-how we have in
circumspection, that is, when relating to things as ready-to-hand. This is what
I believe he means when he says that the circumspective dealing with a piece
of equipment is that "from which it acquires its specific Thingly character.,
56
Recall the list of items in my study. Making a list was a cognitive activity that
required cognitive judgment individuating the items in the study, i.e.,
identifying their separate "Thingly characters." Why individuate pens from
pencils, for example-why not have simply listed writing utensils? Indeed,
why individuate writing utensils from scissors, or a magnifying lens, or
anything? To start with, one reaches for pens and pencils, not scissors, in-
order-to-write. Pens and pencils are ready-to-hand for different purposes than
scissors, and so when it comes time to individuate the items in the study, this
practical relationship to the items makes it seem natural to individuate them
differently. But why individuate pens and pencils? For me, at least, they are
ready-to-hand for different purposes: pens in-order-to-write-on-paper, pencils
in-order-to-write-in-books. I do not like pen marks in books, so pencils, in my
repertoire of everyday equipment, are reserved for that purpose. When I then
look "thematically," like a theoretical knower, at the contents of my study, it
again seems natural to individuate pencils and pens. Circumspection, then, is
primordial in the sense that theoretical knowing depends on-takes its direction
from, is shaped by-the practical know-how we have when relating to things
as ready-to-hand.
Heidegger makes the same point later in Being and 7ime when he writes:
In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a "signification" over
some naked thing which is present-at-hand ... but [rather] when
something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in
question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our
56. Id. at 98.
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understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets
laid out by the interpretation. 1
In other words, a theoretical description of the world actually individuates and
describes things the way it does because of the practical relationship we
already bear to those things as ready-to-hand.
This general theme of the primordiality or basicness of the circumspective
relation to things as ready-to-hand is central in Heidegger, particularly to his
famous attack upon the problem of skepticism in the Cartesian tradition of
epistemology.58 Here, however, I want to concentrate on two other issues.
We have seen that Heidegger claims that theoretical knowing, or cognition,
is parasitic upon circumspection, or practical know-how. But to have an
argument against the foundational status of "theory" per se, Heidegger also
needs the claim that practical know-how is never itself amenable to pure
theoretical articulation.59  This presents some difficult issues in the
interpretation of Heidegger. In their stead, let me propose two considerations
that are Heideggerian in spirit. First, consider the sheer magnitude of what is
contemplated by asserting the primacy of theory: One must be able to produce
a lexical ordering of rules describing the whole network of semiautomatic ways
we have of coping with everyday events and things-getting dressed, tending
to personal hygiene, feeding oneself, leaving the house, commuting, working
at the office, doing errands, and the like. For each of these events, the array
of equipment with which we deal-circumspectly-is enormous. What would
such a theory of the everyday look like? Just consider "getting dressed." Could
we do much better than The New Yorker cartoon showing a man sitting on his
bed looking at the sign he has posted on the wall that reads, "Pants first, then
shoes"? As a rule, though, that will hardly help any of us get dressed. Think,
for instance, of the issue of which pants, a decision made against the
background of a whole field of practical know-how about degrees of
57. Id. at 190-91.
58. See id. at 86-90. This issue is discussed helpfully (if somesshat repctlttiel)) in CiARitL.s B
GUIGNON, HEIDEGGER AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE (1983) For a nch. s)steinanic treatment of the
topic, see also JOHN RICHARDSON, EXISTENTIAL EPISTEMOLOGY (1986) These accounts, b studenits ol
Dreyfus, follow in large part the account now set out in DREYFUS. supra note 34. at 248-51 l am inrined
to think that the attack on the Cartesian tradition of epistemology is not successful, and indeed, is dceplN
confused. The confusion is brought out nicely by Dreyfus "It is only %%hen %%e r flect philosophi.all) on
the structure of deliberative, representational intentionality that wc get skepticism, coping practices, on the
contrary, do not represent and so cannot misrepresent." Id at 249. The reader should be forgi'.en it this
strikes him or her as an argument for the irrelevance of the Heideggenan point to skepticism The issue,
of course, is more complex than this, but is tangential to my concerns here- For t more substantial, and
representative, critique of the Heideggerian line. see Leslie Ste.enson. Heidegger on t'arestani Skeptic ism.
I BRIT. J. HIST. PHIL. 81 (1993).
59. That is, Heidegger needs an argument against the position well represented in lie mainsircam of
the philosophical tradition by Leibmz's claim that "the most important obscrsations and turns of skill in
all sorts of trades and professions are as yet unwritten .... Of course we can also ssnte up this practicc.
since it is at bottom just another theory .... - LEIBNIZ, SELECTIONS 48 (Philip P Wiener ed. 195 1) (1 am
grateful to Larry Solum for this reference.)
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appropriate formality and informality, comfort, practicality, and the like. The
complexity is staggering; but what is worse is that it is not apparent that we
could ever fully capture in theoretical form what we do with practical ease.
Earlier in this century, Carnap's project in the Aufbau60 and then logical
behaviorism in the philosophy of mind61 foundered on a similar difficulty:
Neither could deliver the proposed reduction of, respectively, physical objects
to sense-impressions, or of mental states to hypothetical patterns of behavior.
At some point, however, "in-principle" reductions become suspect when they
have no successful instantiations. Show us a theoretical reduction of practical
know-how to explicit rules, the Heideggerian might say, and then we will take
the challenge seriously.
It bears emphasis here that Heidegger's point in all of this is not simply
that in our everyday activities we possess "tacit knowledge" that makes these
activities possible.62 Heidegger's point goes further than that. Heidegger's
unusual claim is precisely that there is a type of noncognitive foundation to
intelligibility, a type of intentionality that is neither conscious nor propositional
in form. Heidegger's claim is, in Hubert Dreyfus's happy phrasing, that
"'mindless' everyday coping skills [are] the basis of all intelligibility. '63 The
Background for Heidegger is not a tacit belief system, an implicit theory, but
a learned way of acting-or "coping" with things and situations-that renders
the world meaningful.
This last observation suggests a possible second argument against the
primacy of theory. Our mindless coping skills invest things and circumstances
with a meaning, but they do so without that meaning being a matter of tacit
beliefs, of implicit propositional attitudes. I believe that my wife is the most
wonderful person in the world and I wish to spend the rest of my life with her.
These are propositional attitudes: the belief that a particular proposition is true
(namely, that "my wife is the most wonderful person in the world") and the
desire that a particular proposition be true (namely, that "I spend the rest of
my life with her"). I have made these propositional attitudes explicit, but it is
fair to say that I hold them tacitly all the time as well. Yet one would surely
have a very thin picture of intimacy in its "everydayness" if one thought that
60. See RUDOLF CARNAP, THE LoGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD (Rolf A. George trans., 2d cd.
1967).
61. See, e.g., Carl G. Hempel, The Logical Analysis of Psychology, in READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY OF
PSYCHOLOGY 14, 17-22 (Ned Block ed., 1980).
62. Heidegger is often wrongly construed that way in the legal literature. See, e.g.. Thomas C. Grey,
Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 801 (1989) ("Heidegger held that all belicfs
presuppose prejudices-judgments already made, implicit in practice, prior to reflection, largely historical
and collective in origin, tacitly accepted, and for the moment unquestioned."); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond
Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REv. 889, 898 n.20 (1992) (discussing "the
Heideggerian notion that our pre-existing, historically developed beliefs structure the way we perceive the
world"). What these authors describe sounds more like what Heidegger calls "fore-sight" rather than "fore-
having" (the Background). HEIDEGGER, supra note 36, at 191. On these issues, see DREYFUS, supra note
34, at 198-201; Hubert Dreyfus, Holism and Hermeneutics, 34 REv. METAPlYSICS 3, 10-12 (1980).
63. DREYFUS, supra note 34, at 3.
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a "theory" based on these implicit or explicit beliefs and desires was
descriptive and explanatory of a loving relationship. Anyone who has been part
of an intimate relationship knows that its meaning is defined most immediately
by the whole way of being and acting that one shares with the loved one. With
a person with whom one is intimate, one has a wholly different and special
sense of personal space, of the boundaries of privacy, of the propriety of
physical contact, of what can be talked about, of how it can be expressed.
Think just for a moment about each of these things-personal space, privacy,
physical contact, conversation-and how they differ as between your spouse
or lover on the one hand, and then your colleagues, your students, your barber,
your adversary in court, on the other. The "skills" we deploy in intimacy-the
frequent overstepping of personal space, the physical touching, the
unselfconscious opening to view of relatively private activities (hygiene,
dressing, the whole ritual of the toilet), the special ways of speaking
(intonation, choice of words, what is left unsaid, etc.)-it is precisely these
noncognitive skills that mark a person as one with whom we are intimate. As
Heidegger notes, "we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some
naked thing which is present-at-hand"; 6  rather, our preexisting "involvement"
with that thing or person, the "mindless coping skills" we deploy
unconsciously, invest the thing or person with a signification already. But if
these skills, these ways of acting, are not themselves tacit propositions, then
the meaning they embody (for example, that this is a person with whom I am
intimate) will not be amenable to theoretical articulation, which is essentially
propositional in form.65
But, one might object, why should these skills not admit of "translation"
(as it were) into propositions expressing patterns of rule governed behavior?
At this point, it seems to me the Heideggerian must have recourse once again
to the breathtaking difficulty of the task. For example, after I wrote the
preceding paragraph, my wife came into the study, started reading over my
shoulder, and then rested her bare foot on my knee. Without thinking about it,
she knew that it was okay to do so. Similarly without thinking, she knows it
64. HEIDEGGER, supra note 36, at 190.
65. Hubert Dreyfus suggests another nice illustration of the point. In commenting on Heidegger. he
quotes approvingly the following illustrative observation by Bourdieu
[I]n all societies, children are particularly attentive to the gestures and postures which. in their
eyes, express everything that goes to make an accomplished adult-a way of walking. a tilt of
the head, facial expressions, ways of sitting and of using implements. always associated with
a tone of voice, a style of speech, and (how could it be otherwise?) a certain subjective
experience.
PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 87 (1977). quoted in DREYFUS, supra note 34,
at 17. According to Dreyfus, all of these characteristics-the way of walking, the tilt of the head. the facial
expressions, etc.-in Bourdieu's view "add up to an interpretation of what it is to be a person "' Id Class
differences are often made manifest in this way: custodial staff and sanitation workers. for example. tend
to avert their eyes, and to proceed through their tasks as though they were invisiblc--often expressing
surprise when they are greeted or acknowledged by members of the bourgeois classes- The latter. b)
contrast, often carry themselves with a constant expectation of recognition and a sense of weighty presence
1996]
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would not be okay to do the same thing at work with her boss. On the other
hand, in some circumstances, she could touch the shoulder or arm of her boss;
and presumably in even more circumstances, she could touch my shoulder or
arm. We all possess, to varying degrees, the practical know-how regarding
personal space and physical contact with respect to our professional colleagues
and our intimate companions, the practical know-how that, through its very
exercise, gives a meaning to these relationships (establishing this one as
"professional," that one as "intimate"). But does anyone think they could
produce the comprehensive rule book describing the "do's" and "don't's" of
personal space and physical contact?66 Heidegger denies, with some
plausibility, that we could, and he does so precisely because he denies that
these practical skills admit of theoretical articulation.
We are now finally in a position to explicate Heidegger's famous notion
of "being-in-the-world." "Being-in-the-world," says Heidegger, "amounts to a
nonthematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments
constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment. '67 Stated a
bit differently, and I hope more clearly, the way human beings exist or "dwell"
in the world is fundamentally in a state of practical absorption in tasks and
skills, in which theoretical knowledge of things (as present-at-hand) is only a
secondary and parasitic phenomenon.
Like Heidegger, the anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu also contrasts the
"theoretical mode[] of knowledge" with "the practical mode of knowledge
which is the basis of ordinary experience of the social world. 68 According
to Bourdieu, human practices "have as their principle not a set of conscious,
constant rules, but practical schemes, opaque to their possessors.,'69 "Real
mastery" of the "logic" of these practices is possible only through "practical
learning of the schemes of perception, appreciation and action which are the
precondition of all 'sensible' thought and practice, and which, being
continually reinforced by actions and discourses produced according to the
same schemes, are excluded from the universe of objects of thought '70 (i.e.,
66. As Doug Laycock points out to me, a central problem in the law of sexual harassment is precisely
the impossibility of codifying rules of conduct for those who either (a) lack any understanding of them at
all, or (b) have inconsistent understandings of them.
67. HEIDEGGER, supra note 36, at 107.
68. PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LoGic OF PRAcTIcE 25 (Richard Nice trans., Polity Press 1990) (1980).
Bourdieu's interests differ from Heidegger's in at least the following respect: Bourdieu wants to examine
the theoretical knower, "the epistemological and social conditions" of his activity, to illuminate the
conditions of possibility of theoretical knowledge. Id. But like Heidegger, he is motivated to undertake this
inquiry precisely because he sees theoretical knowledge as missing out on the more primary mode of
"practical" engagement with the social world. See id. at 26. Bourdieu's question is: What is it about
theoretical knowledge and the theoretical knower that makes him miss the practical? See id. at 25-29. This
question is suggested in Heidegger as well, see HEIDEGGER, supra note 36, at 76, but is worked out in more
detail in BOURDIEU, supra.
69. BOURDiEU, supra note 68, at 12.
70. Id. at 14. Bourdieu specifically distinguishes the "two relations to the world, one theoretical, the
other practical." Id.
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from the realm of theory). This type of practical know-how Bourdieu describes
as the "immediate but unselfconscious understanding which defines the
practical relationship to the world."'"
What we may call the Heidegger-Bourdieu line has actually been nicely
articulated in Gerald Postema's important discussion of Dworkin's Law's
Empire.72 In criticizing Dworkin's account of what it is to interpret a social
practice, Postema observes that to become part of a communal practice
"involves a good deal more than merely learning a set of routine responses to
routinized situations" but rather requires "practical mastery of a discipline."' ,
Practical discipline, says Postema, "always outstrips the resources of the theory
to meet novel situations. 74 Such discipline, Postema continues, involves
a trained social sense. Not only is it socially acquired, learned through
interaction and participation, but what is handed down and learned is
itself a shared capacity. A social capacity is the capacity to move
around with familiarity in the world of the practice common to its
participants. To learn a social practice is to become acquainted
through participation with a new common world; it is to enter and
take up a place in a world already constituted. 5
What Postema calls the "common world" that the learner of a practice finds
"already constituted" is essentially what Heidegger means by describing human
existence in terms of "being-in-the-world": We exist practically absorbed in a
world "already constituted," constituted precisely by the practical involvements
we have with the things and people in it. We have, in turn, a social practice
when a group of people share the same type of practical absorption in things,
tasks, persons, and the like. Like Heidegger, Postema emphasizes that practical
competence "outstrips" the resources of a theory, presumably because practical
competence and skill resist explicit theoretical articulation.
II. HEIDEGGER AND THE THEORY OF ADJUDICATION
Let me summarize what has been said so far. A theory of adjudication
aims both to describe how judges really do decide cases and to tell judges how
they ought to decide them. To be descriptively adequate, a theory of
adjudication should include, in part, a theory of "relevance" judgments, the sort
of judgments judges make in deciding that one case is or is not relevant to a
71. Id. at 19.
72. See Gerald J. Postema, "Protestant" Interpretation and Social Practices. 6 LAW & PIIL_ 283
(1987).
73. Id. at 302-03.
74. Id. at 313.
75. Id.
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case presently before the court.76 Heidegger has argued that at the foundation
of all intelligibility is a Background of mindless coping skills, and that this
Background of practical know-how does not admit of theoretical articulation
in terms of explicit rules. To conjoin the two parts of this paper so far-the
theory of adjudication and Heidegger-we need only to see that the capacity
for making relevance judgments depends on the Background of mindless
coping skills, and thus, as a result, no theory of such judgments will be
possible."
76. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of
LegalArgument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REv. 923, 933, 951-52 (1996) (criticizing certain other theories
of adjudication for failing to provide conceptual explication of judgments of "relevant similarity"). In
Brewer's somewhat loaded terminology, see id. at 951-53, the position defended in this Article is both
"mystical" and "skeptical": It both denies that we can give a theoretically explicit account of judgments
of "relevance," though, at the same time, it does not suppose that arguments by analogy nece3sarily have
much "rational force." Even Brewer, it bears noting, concedes to the "mystics" that "there is inevitably an
uncodifiable imaginative moment in exemplary, analogical reasoning" (though he thinks, perhaps rightly,
that this makes legal reasoning no worse off than "other areas of reasoning in whose rational force our
intellectual culture has placed great confidence-namely, both the empirical and the demonstrative
sciences"). Id. at 954. Later he speaks of the need for a "rule" that would provide a "patterned direction
of attention" to the relevant features of a particular set of examples, but then never actually provides one.
See id. at 973; cf id. at 978 (argument by analogy requires, among other things, "making sense of patterns
of characteristics"). Though he sheds much light on the logical form of analogical arguments, he never, as
far as I can see, rebuts the mystic who thinks that we cannot have a "rational explication," id. at 1026. of
judgments of relevance. Instead, he conflates the question of whether we can have an explicit theory of
relevance judgments with the question of whether or not there are "significant rational constraints" on the
process of analogizing or disanalogizing particular cases. See id. But because judgments of relevance arc
only part of the reasoning process that Brewer claims is rationally constrained (the process, as he puts it,
of constructing analogy-warranting rules and analogy-warranting rationales), nothing he says shows that
we can expect to have a theory of relevance judgments, even if analogical reasoning is not without all
rational constraints. "[A] knowledge of the logical form of argument by analogy (a 'knowledge that') will
not," he finally admits, "provide all the skills one needs to make or criticize such arguments effectively (a
'knowledge-how')." Id. at 1027. But this is to concede the point of the Heideggerian critique developed
here.
77. Notice that the Heideggerian challenge is actually quite different from the superficially similar one
posed by Stanley Fish in, e.g., Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987). While
Heidegger's claim is that the mindless coping skills that are the foundation of intelligibility cannot be made
explicit in the way "theory" contemplates, Fish's claim is that a theoretical reconstruction of the "tacit
knowledge" (or coping skills) at the foundation of practice is neither necessary for participation in the
practice, nor does it make a difference in the practice. See id. at 1774-90. In short, for Fish, "theory" is
not useful (hence the title of his piece), while for Heidegger "theory" is not possible (whatever its use is
or might be).
This is not to deny that there are Heideggerian moments in Fish, as when he remarks, "Someone who
looks with practice-informed eyes sees a field already organized in terms of perspicuous obligations, self-
evidently authorized procedures, and obviously relevant pieces of evidence." Id. at 1788. The difference
is that for Heidegger or Bourdieu the ultimate point is that at the foundation of this field of intelligibility
are mindless coping skills that resist explicit articulation in propositional form, while for Fish the ultimate
point is only that "practice-informed" eyes are enough, and theory makes no difference. The Fish critique
would actually be more plausible if it were conjoined with the Heideggerian point; as it is, it invites easy
rejoinders. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?.
41 STAN. L. REv. 871, 909-10 (1989) (distinguishing between process of discovery and process of
justification, and noting that "theory" is concerned primarily with latter, while Fish's point speaks only to
former); see also RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEOAL
JUSTIFICATION 25-36 (1961) (providing seminal jurisprudential discussion of distinction between processes
of discovery and justification). I discuss at the end of this Article the consequences of the Heideggerian
point for theories of justification (i.e,, normative theories). See also Leiter, supra note 16.
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Let us return to Holmes's Vermont judge considering the case of the
broken chum. Whatever the precise issue-e.g., standard of care or, more
likely, consequential damages-the judge must know something about chums
and their place in farm life in order to assess what other cases involving
broken property have precedential value. A churn is ready-to-hand for turning
milk into butter. Butter is ready-to-hand for consumption or for bartering or for
sale. A chum may be simple to use or require great skill. It may be customary
or unusual for farmers to lend them out. A churn may be easy to fix, or
difficult to replace. The loss of a chum may be utterly disruptive to the
business of the farm or a minor inconvenience. The churn, in short, exists at
the nexus of a range of practical skills-churning, farming, consuming,
selling-all of which inform our sense of which other cases are relevant to this
one, and also of which outcome would be appropriate. Your neighbor borrows
your hammer and breaks it; that case may or may not be relevant to thinking
about the chum case. If you are a carpenter, and your broken hammer is a
specialized item, central to your daily trade, then the cases may be relevantly
similar. If, instead, you are a professor of law and philosophy unable to fix
anything, but the owner, nonetheless, of a hammer bestowed by thoughtful in-
laws, the course of decision in that case may be less useful. One reason, no
doubt, that Llewellyn thought that the ideal judge was one who had been
thoroughly immersed in the mercantile culture on which he now sits in
judgment is precisely because only by knowing, say, the "meaning" of the
chum in its practical contexts can one possibly decide what precedent is or is
not relevant.78 If, of course, one could have a complete theory of chums and
their place in farming culture, and a complete theory of every other item of
equipment and its place in its particular economic culture, then one could
presumably generate the needed theory of relevance. But do we have such a
theory? Plainly not. Rather, we seem to depend on the practical sensitivity of
judges to the similarities and differences appropriate to each cause.
What about Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority7 9 and
New York v. United States?80 I noted earlier Justice White's view that Garcia
should have been controlling in New York."' But how does one know that
Garcia is relevant? Consider the most superficial difficulty: Why should a case
concerning wage and hour regulations applying to employees of a municipal
transit authority in Texas (Garcia) be relevant to a case concerning the
regulation of radioactive waste disposal by the State of New York? Notice that
in posing this question I have not even mentioned the variable that Justice
O'Connor finds decisive: namely, that one case involves a regulation of the
78. See KARL N. LLEwE.LYN. THE COMMON LAW TRADMON 121-57 (1960)
79. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
80. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
81. Id. at 202 (White, J., dissenting).
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state and private entities, while the other involves a regulation directed only
at the states. 2
Relevance is, of course, relative! Facts are relevant only with respect to
some set of issues. The issue in Garcia and New York is state autonomy as
protected by the Tenth Amendment. Why, then, are the Texas versus New
York or the wage and hour requirements versus radioactive waste disposal
differences not relevant? What must one "know" to know that they are
irrelevant?
At least for the O'Connor-White debate, there are really only four
operative concepts: regulation, autonomy, state, and private entity. Justice
O'Connor claims that where state autonomy is usurped by a regulation
affecting only states, Garcia is inapposite. Justice White replies that the
usurpation of state autonomy is no more or less where the regulation also
reaches private entities, and so the difference is irrelevant. To know who is
right, it seems we must know whether or not a regulation that reaches only
states, and not private entities, is more damaging to state autonomy. What
constitutes the Background against which these issues can even become
intelligible?
Let me borrow, again, an example from Dreyfus to sharpen the question.
Dreyfus writes:
[T]o be a hammer is to be used to pound in nails for building houses,
etc. For a culture that always tied things together, there could be no
hammers because there would be nothing that it was to be a hammer.
But there could, nonetheless, be pieces of wood with iron blobs on the
end, since wood and iron are natural kinds and their being and causal
powers make no essential reference to any in-order-tos .... 83
The Background of intelligibility for "hammers," then, includes the cultural
practice of binding things together with nails and the like, for hammers are
essentially ready-to-hand in-order-to-bind-with-nails. In the absence of such a
practice, the things we call "hammers" are simply pieces of wood with iron
blobs on one end.84
What then constitutes the horizon of intelligibility in which "regulation,"
"autonomy,". "state," and "private entity" become visible? The Heideggerian
thesis is that competence with and immersion in a network of practical
82. See id. at 161-62.
83. DREYFUS, supra note 34, at 257-58. As Jody Kraus has pointed out to me, the idea that there
could be such a thing as "natural kinds"-i.e., things that are what they are independent of anyone's
practical interests-does not seem consistent with the thrust of the interpretation of Heidegger that Dreyfus
develops.
84. This should be understood as a point not about semantics per se, but rather about the conditions
under which signs that have semantic value (strictly speaking) become culturally available and significant.
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concerns is necessary in order for these particular concepts to be intelligible.
In order to work with the distinction between a state or public entity and a
private one, for example, you need to be conversant with at least these other
concepts: ownership, control, elected body, profit, fees, and taxation. Public
and private entities are often indistinguishable in terms of personnel, functions,
and appearance. The city police can be easily confused with private security
personnel; but they differ in that the city police do not charge a fee, they do
not seek a profit, they are controlled by authorities that are responsive to
public sentiment expressed through voting, they are paid out of monies raised
through taxation, they have special (for example, constitutional) obligations
attached to entities "publicly" owned, and the like. By contrast, private security
personnel charge a fee (to someone), they are owned or controlled by
individuals or other entities not ultimately under the authority of elected
officials, they are not supported (typically) by tax dollars, and the like. Just to
get a handle, however, on this elucidation of the difference, one must be
conversant with the practices of payment, taxation, voting, and control or
ownership, among others. In a cultural order without the practices of payment,
taxation, voting (or some surrogate), and property rights (which vest control),
the whole problem that animates Garcia and New York becomes senseless.
So, too, the intelligibility of "regulation" and "'autonomy" is arguably
parasitic on the following sort of practical competence: being able to
distinguish "external" and "internal" limitations. A nonautonomous action is
one subject to an external limitation, while an autonomous action is subject to
an internal limitation. Since the federal government is "external" to the state,
limitations originating there violate the autonomy of the state. At least in the
case of the individual (from which, arguably, we generalize in thinking about
the autonomy of other entities), understanding of the internal/external divide
is parasitic on the practices which institutionalize the difference: for example,
the practice of granting authority to the agent's verdict on her mental states (an
internal matter), or the practice of ascribing responsibility for -'volitional"
conduct, conduct which originates "internally."
Even this will not do, however, since as the tradition of German Idealism
has shown, there can be internal limitations on action that undermine
autonomy (action based on desire, for Kant) and external limitations that are
essential for autonomy (the laws of the rational state, for Hegel). What this
highlights is that it is essential to the concept of autonomy that limitations on
action come from the right source, that is, from something that we identify as
essential to the agent (whether the agent be a state or an individual). A state
does not act autonomously if its policies are dictated by the corporate lobbyists
that have the state legislature in their pocket-even though all the lobbyists are
residents of the state, and even though all the legislation is enacted by duly
elected legislators. Thus, to have a view about the violation of state autonomy
one needs to have a handle on the concept of the essence of "statehood" itself.
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The concept of statehood not only requires a wealth of propositional
knowledge-for example, about the components of government or the
legitimate reasons for state action-but a wealth of practical understanding of
what it means for a state to act and what functions states perform in the lives
of their citizens. It is immersion in the network of practices constitutive of
statehood that makes intelligible the worry about the "autonomy" of the
state.
85
One could, of course, keep tracing this Background of intelligibility for
each concept ad infinitum. And there may perhaps be something unsatisfyingly
sketchy about the picture of the Background that in fact emerges. On the other
hand, if Heidegger is right that the Background of practical know-how does
not admit of theoretical articulation, then a "sketch" of some of its elements
and contours is all that we have any right to expect. The sketch, if successful,
should simply throw into relief some of the practical competence we need, but
may not have noticed, in order to make cognitive judgments about relevance
or about anything else. Good judges, immersed as they are in their adjudicative
practices, make these judgments all the time; but if the foregoing sketch is
right, there is no reason to think any theory could ever do justice to what they
are doing.
IV. HEIDEGGER, THEORY OF ADJUDICATION, AND PRACTICAL REASON
Let me conclude with four observations.
First, if this broadly Heideggerian critique is on target, then the theory of
adjudication fails not only in its descriptive ambitions. We can see this readily
if we recall both the Presumption-that current adjudicative practice is
"roughly right"-and Mackie's account of the Standard Relation between
normative and descriptive elements in the theory: As a normative matter, the
theory wants the descriptive account of judicial decisionmaking to be, as
Mackie puts it, "a truer description than it yet is."86 In other words, because
normative theory of adjudication is parasitic upon accurate description, the
impossibility of complete description necessarily handicaps prescription. If
what judges are doing in deciding cases is, in significant part, dependent upon
the horizon of intelligibility created by the Background, and if we have no way
of articulating the type of understanding constituted by the Background, then,
on the normative side, we can do no better than an empty gesture: "Do as you
85. The situation is somewhat complicated by the fact that Garcia concerns a regulation of a city, San
Antonio, while New York concerns a regulation of a state. Assuming we are suitably immersed in the
relevant practices, however, we can see that the issue about the autonomy of local government (state or
city) is relevantly similar, and that the regulations-though one is concerned with wages, the other with
the disposal of radioactive wastes-are also relevantly similarly with respect to local autonomy.
86. Mackie, supra note 14, at 163.
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do, judges, though we cannot say how that is."" This should prove
worrisome on the plausible assumption that we can only better assess what we
ought to be doing if we actually know what we are doing. But if Heidegger
is right, then there is a lot that judges are doing in deciding cases, that we, as
jurisprudential theorists, cannot articulate or, consequently, cannot subject to
critical evaluation.
A second observation warrants comment at this point. For the plausibility
of this Heideggerian attack on theory of adjudication turns ultimately on
whether Heidegger (and Bourdieu and Dreyfus and all those others who follow
Heidegger in this regard) are really right that practical competence resists
theoretical articulation. It is not clear in Heidegger, for example, that there is
anything that would count as an a priori argument for this claim. But without
such an argument, it seems that for any domain of human activity it will
remain an empirical question whether Heidegger is right about the prospects
of "theory" in that domain. I have tried here only to invoke some plausible
intuitions about why the prospects for "theory" in adjudication and elsewhere
may fall prey to the Heideggerian objection. Even here, though, it might be
objected that the cases that I have concentrated on are not representative, and
that the prospects for a theory of "relevance" judgments are better than these
examples would suggest. More importantly, someone might object that even
without a complete theory of "relevance" judgments-one that would require
the sort of explicit articulation of the Background that Heidegger denies is
possible-a theory of adjudication has accomplished enough if it gives us a
theoretical articulation of those aspects of the practice that are not coextensive
with the Background. Even if the Background is opaque, much about judicial
decision may not be. I concede that it is not obvious that an interesting theory
of adjudication must be a theory of the Background." On the other hand, it
is striking that, because analogical reasoning is central to judging, so too is the
capacity for making judgments of relevance. Yet if the Heideggerian critique
is conceded, then it follows that the theory of adjudication can shed no light
on a central part of the judicial enterprise: the making of judgments of
relevance! I return to this point momentarily.
87. Of course, it remains possible, and indeed likely, that we can still aniculatc norms for
decisionmaking that speak to those aspects of judicial decision that are not coextcnsic with the
Background competence. Such norms are also likely to be quite important
88. If writers like Kent Greenawalt arc correct, then there is. in fact. nothing distinctvc about legal
reasoning; that is, legal reasoning simply adopts methods of reasoning (e.g.. reasoning by analogy. which
is itself dependent upon relevance judgments) that are familiar from nonlegal life. See KFNT"I GRE.NAWALT.
LAW AND OBJECTiViTY 199 (1992) ('The major reasons in law are not distinctive to law I cannot think
of a characteristically legal reason that does not have a familiar analogue in common expenence and
judgment."). In that case, if Heidegger is right about the centrality of the Background to understanding in
ordinary life, then he would be right a fortiori about understanding in law. At this point, the legal
philosopher might wonder why this problem should be considered her problem? Part of the answer, of
course, is that the legal philosopher seeks a theory of legal understanding.
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There remains a different respect, though, in which the Heideggerian
critique resonates with recent work in the theory of adjudication, and, indeed,
might offer something to it. I have in mind, of course, the practical reasoning
or practical wisdom theories of adjudication that have commanded considerable
attention in recent years.89 For the practical reasoning theories seem to pursue
an insight congenial to Heidegger: namely, that the practice of judicial decision
resists a certain sort of theoretical articulation. Consider, for example, Judge
John Noonan's complaint about Dworkin's theory of adjudication:
Mr. Dworkin is too abstract, contrary to his choice of the appellate
judge as the best example of the law at work. The judge has far less
time to imitate Hercules than has the law professor, who can actually
be the master of his own comer of the field. If there is any reason to
prefer the judge to him as a paradigm, it is that the decision of cases
affecting real people demands a sensitivity that handling hypothetical
ones does not. Such sensitivity is nurtured by experience. It eventuates
in what Aristotle calls prudence. In that small summa of American
jurisprudence "The Legal Enterprise," Robert Rodes offered the
homely image of a soccer referee. One cannot spell out precisely in
any rule book what his calls should be, since sometimes to call a foul
will penalize the team that has been fouled. Only discretion makes the
good referee; the same holds for judges. I do not think this element
of practical wisdom is captured in any of Mr. Dworkin's
formulations. 90
Substitute Heidegger's notion of the Background for the talk of "experience"
and "prudence," and Judge Noonan has lodged the same critique as that being
discussed here: that one cannot give an explicit, rule-book version of how
judges decide cases, because some significant part of what goes into judicial
decision depends on a background of practical skills which resist such
cognitive articulation.
The problem with some of these practical reasoning theories, it seems to
me, is that they cannot rest content with this criticism: They seek to generate
a competitor "theory" to traditional theories which are usually dubbed,
89. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 209-25 (1993); Daniel A. Farber, The
Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992);
Lawrence B. Solum, Comment, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial
Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988). A number of these pieces take Llewellyn as representative of
this line of thought. For a similar take on Llewellyn, but from a Wittgensteinian perspective, see Dennis
M. Patterson, Law's Practice, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 575 (1990) (reviewing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE
LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA (1989)). For a rather different, and more skeptical, view of the later Llewellyn,
see Leiter, supra note 16, at 274.
90. John T. Noonan, Jr., Hercules and the Snail Darter, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1986, § 7, at 13; cf.
KRONMAN, supra note 89, at 217 ("The habits that constrain a judge as he goes about his work are not the
product of thought but of experience, and no amount of abstract theorizing can ever be a substitute for
them, much less bring them into being in the first place.").
[Vol. 106: 253
HeinOnline  -- 106 Yale L.J. 278 1996-1997
Heidegger
somewhat loosely, "formalistic." 9' Thus, for example, Daniel Farber describes
the challenge for practical reasoning theorists as being to "describe the
operation of practical reason" so that we can have "confidence in its ability to
guide judicial decisions. 92 The key is to see that "reason includes a broader
range of cognitive activities" than the formalist imagines;" in short, "there
are other cognitive abilities besides deduction on which judges can rely."'
In the case of statutory interpretation, for example, Farber says that we must
recognize that this is not a matter of a "mechanical application of rules . but
instead involves a complex judgment about how to best harmonize text,
legislative history, statutory purpose, and contemporary public policy.""5
Ultimately, though, the practical reason theorist wants to insist that though the
descriptions of practical reason "are much less precise than one might wish,"
practical reason is still real enough. '[M]any other cognitive skills," says
Farber, "also are extremely difficult to explain-for example, the ability to
determine the correct trajectory for throwing a ball-yet these skills obviously
exist.' 9,
Perhaps the mistake, though, is to think that what we are talking about
here is cognitive at all, that the sort of "skill" at the foundation of judgment
is best viewed as involving a tacit theory. This is precisely what Heidegger
denies, which is why he denies that we can expect to have a theory about these
skills. If some practical reasoning theorists are reluctant to take this step, it
may be because they feel the pressure of the dictum usually attributed to
Richard Epstein: "[I]t takes a theory to beat a theory."97 Thus, if practical
reasoning proponents are to supplant the formalists, they must, by the Epstein
dictum, generate a competitor theory. But as an epistemological principle, the
Epstein dictum is nonsense: Significant amounts of recalcitrant data suffice to
beat any theory,98 and the proponents of practical reasoning have produced
91. Thus, Farber says practical reasoning theorists reject the fomalistic % te "that rules and precedents
in and of themselves dictate [via deduction) outcomes." Farber. supra note 89. at 539 (mtphasis added)
It is doubtful, though, that anyone since Blackstone has held this precise %jess land perhaps not e',cn
Blackstone).
92. Id. at 533; see also id. at 542 ("If practical reason is only a 'ague description of hos judges
should decide cases, it seemingly provides no method to criticize their decisions Nor doc, it pro ide any
constraint on outcomes, but leaves judges free to impose their own social %alues at the expense of the
legislatures.").
93. Id. at 540.
94. Id. at 554.
95. Id. at 541; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P Fricke). Stattorn Interpretrtlon a
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 352 (1990) (arguing that legal interpretation inol'.s utilizing
broad range of evidence, none of whtch is necessarily dispositise)
96. Farber, supra note 89. at 554. Notice Farber's assumption that thro%%ing a ball is a cointte skill
97. Richard A. Epstein, Common Las Labor La; and Realt A Rejoinder to Prvfessor Getiman
and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983).
98. I do not mean to deny here the Duhem-Qume thesis about the underdetermination of theoncs by
evidence, or Quine's closely related doctrine that no theoretical statement is immune from recision
Recalcitrant data can always be accommodated if we are willing to make substantial enough adjustments
in our background theoretical assumptions. But this subtle point growing out of the epistemology of science
is not Epstein's. Epstein asserts that one cannot displace a theoretical edifice simply by adducing etidencc
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precisely such data against the formalist theories.99 Surely Farber is right in
speaking about the "inevitability" of practical reason-or of something that
fills the gaping holes left after the formalist is done.
Borrowing a phrase from the philosopher Stephen Schiffer, the proponents
of practical reason or practical wisdom should really adopt what we might call
the "No-Theory" Theory of Adjudication. to According to the No-Theory
Theory, judicial decision is not something about which one should expect to
have a theory, because one can never produce the needed theoretical reduction
of adjudication to explicit rules of decision. Some of the defenders of practical
wisdom correctly embrace the No-Theory Theory. Anthony Kronman, for
example, in commenting on Llewellyn's notion of the "horse-sense" that a
good judge needs, observes that "horse-sense, like soundness of judgment in
other areas of life, is not reducible to a method"'' and adds that "[t]he work
of 'the cold intellect' . . . can never ... replace the practical know-how on
which the craft of appellate judging rests."' 2 Once acquired, through time
and experience, these habits of practical know-how constrain decision,' 13
which is precisely why Kronman aptly observes that "the true judicial
craftsman, the judge endowed with horse-sense, knows that his work is
constrained even in its most creative aspects and regards the iconoclastic bogey
of an utterly free judicial prerogative as a fantasy or myth."'1' 4
Kronman, of course, looks to Aristotle (and Llewellyn), not Heidegger, in
support of these points. 05 But the choice of intellectual authority for the
theme hardly matters. Whether it is Aristotle, or Heidegger, or Wittgenstein,
or Bourdieu, the core idea remains the same, and it is one with potentially far-
reaching implications: There is much in human judgment and action that is
inconsistent with the claims of the theory. It is, of course, easy to understand why free market utopians like
Epstein would find such a doctrine attractive: It precludes taking into account the actual reality of, for
example, labor relations under capitalism. This is precisely what Julius G. Getman and Thomas C. Kohler
point out, see Julius G. Getman & Thomas C. Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A
Response to Professor Epstein, 92 YALE LJ. 1415, 1416-17, 1427-33 (1983), to which Epstein responds,
see Epstein, supra note 97. Epstein claims that, according to economic theory, an essentially nineteenth-
century legal regime in labor relations will promote liberty and autonomy. Getman and Kohler point out
that historical evidence shows this is not so. Epstein replies, in essence, "Economic theory says it ought
to be so, and unless you have a better theory, it is so." See Epstein, supra note 97, at 143-51. As an
epistemological precept, this is so bizarre as to defy characterization, but it is certainly not a posture that
finds any support from Quine or Duher. For a discussion of the generally poor predictive record of
economics, as well as a skilled philosophical exploration of why this might be so, see ALEXANDER
ROSENBERG, ECONOMICS-MATHEMATICAL POLMCS OR SCIENCE OF DIMINISHING RETURNS? (1992).
99. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 89, at 543-49.
100. See STEPHEN SCHIFFER, REMNANTS OF MEANING 265 (1987).
101. KRONMAN, supra note 89, at 223.
102. Id. at 219. Compare Michael Tigar's related observation, analogizing trial lawyers to cooks:
"With a recipe, you can cook something. With theory, techniques, and skill-informed by experience-you
can call yourself a cook." MICHAEL E. TIGAR, EXAMINING WITNESSES xi (1993).
103. Recall that for Heidegger, the Background forms the horizon of intelligibility, meaning that it
enables as well as delimits the sphere of understanding.
104. KRONMAN, supra note 89, at 224.
105. See, e.g., id. at 225.
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possible only because of practical skills and competence that remain beyond
the reach of theoretical articulation. Heidegger, more than these others, makes
a detailed phenomenological case-a case based on a careful analysis of our
actual experience-for the impossibility of theory. If he is right, this may give
us additional reason to rethink the jurisprudential program for a theory of
adjudication.
Despite its commitment to a certain level of descriptive adequacy, the heart
of the theory of adjudication has always been its normative program, its
attempt to tell judges how they ought to decide cases. Because of the Standard
Relation between the descriptive and normative aspects of the theory, however,
a problem at the descriptive level will handicap the theorist's ability to
discharge the normative program: If we cannot (as Heidegger would give us
reason for believing) describe in theoretical terms how judges do decide cases,
then we will not be able to tell them, with any specificity, how they ought to
decide them. Of course, as noted earlier,'O° much of Anglo-American theory
of adjudication has concerned itself with aspects of adjudication other than the
skills that draw on the Background. But to demarcate the theory of
adjudication this way may make such a theory fatally uninteresting. If, as I
have argued, the Background is essential to judgments of relevance, then it is
central to one of the most distinctive judicial flinctions: namely; reasoning by
analogy. Moreover, it seems likely that Background understanding is essential
for other important parts of the judge's job: for example, deciding what
constitutes the "exception" to a rule, or interpreting the omnipresent
"reasonableness" standards in the law."'7 In short, to give up the ambition of
developing a theory of the Background-as Heidegger would tell us we have
to do--entails giving up having a theory that illuminates central aspects of
what judges do. We must ask, then: What sort of theory are we left with, and
is it one worth having?
Of course, we might still develop a theory of other aspects of the judicial
function, perhaps along the lines of Ronald Dworkin's influential account."
There are independent reasons for being skeptical about the prospects of this
kind of theory-some having to do with broadly metaethical considerations
about the objectivity of moral reasoning'o' and some having to do with Legal
Realist arguments about the indeterminacy of law. t1° Like the Heideggerian
arguments against a theory of the Background, these arguments suggest that
the prospects for a fruitful normative theory of adjudication may be dim. One
106. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 23.
108. See DWORKIN, supra note 7; DWORKIN, supra note 18.
109. I develop these arguments in a paper I am now writing, Objectvizr Alorahtl' and Adjudtcation.
in OBJECTIvITY IN LAW AND MORALS (Brian Leiter ed.. forthcoming 1998). For related contsideruton5, see
Mackie, supra note 14.
110. I will explore these in LEITER, supra note 3; see also Brian Letter. Legal Indeterminacy. I LEGAL
THEORY 481 (1995).
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response to this dilemma would be to revisit the Legal Realist idea of aiming
only for a descriptively adequate theory of what courts actually do, not in
terms of what they say they are doing, but in terms of what causes them to do
what they do. Such a theory would abandon the traditional aim of providing
a rational reconstruction of judges' reasons. If successful, however, it would
yield something much more practical: a guide to what courts will do.
I propose to show elsewhere... that such a "naturalized" approach to
jurisprudence (as I call it) warrants more serious consideration than most
Anglo-American legal philosophers would think. In this light, we may
understand Heidegger's arguments against the possibility of developing a
theory of the Background as providing only one type of important reason for
abandoning normative theory, and taking the "naturalistic turn '"t 2 in legal
philosophy.
I 11. See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence (Aug. 23, 1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal).
112. This is a play on the title of THE LINGUISTIC TURN (Richard Rorty ed., 1967). Heidegger would
not advocate "naturalism," though for reasons that are tangential to my concerns here.
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